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AN ACTION IS NOT COMMENCED UNLESS THE
PETITION IS FILED IN A COURT HAVING
JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER
Wasyk v. Trent
87 Ohio L. Abs. 323, 179 N.E.2d 163 (C.P. 1961)
(Affirmed by Court of Appeals; motion to certify granted.)
Plaintiff, an Ohio citizen, and defendant, a West Virginia citizen, were
involved in an automobile collision in Montgomery County, Ohio, on
August 4, 1956. Twenty-five days after the collision, defendant became
domiciled in Ohio. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in the
United States District Court on July 30, 1957, alleging diversity of citizen-
ship as a basis of jurisdiction. Service of summons was made on defendant
under the Ohio nonresident motorist statute.' Summons was delivered by
registered mail to defendant in Ohio. Defendant appeared by counsel and
apparently moved to make definite and certain and to strike certain
allegations, but did not raise the defense of insufficiency of service of proc-
ess or of lack of jurisdiction of the person. By failing to include these
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 2703.20 (1953):
Any non-resident of this state, being the operator or owner of any motor vehicle,
who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state to non-resident
operators and owners, of operating a motor vehicle or of having the same
operated, within this state, or any resident of this state, being the licensed
operator or owner of any motor vehicle under the laws of the state, who sub-
sequently becomes a non-resident or conceals his whereabouts, . . . makes the
secretary of state of the state of Ohio his agent for the service of process in
any civil suit or proceeding instituted in the courts of this state against such
operator, or owner of such motor vehicle, arising out of, or by reason of, any
accident or collision occurring within this state in which such motor vehicle
is involved. Such process shall be served . . . upon the secretary of state by
leaving at the office of the secretary of state . . . a true and attested copy
thereof, and by sending to the defendant, by registered mail, postage prepaid, a
like true and attested copy, with an endorsement thereon of the service upon
said secretary of state, addressed to such defendant at his last known address.
The registered mail return receipt of such defendant shall be attached to and
made a part of the return of service of such process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1):
... Service shall be made ... upon an individual ... by delivering a copy of
the summons and of the complaint to him personally . . . or by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7):
* . . [I]t is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the
manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the manner pre-
scribed by the law of the state in which the service is made for the service of
summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action brought in
the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.
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defenses, defendant presumably waived them. Over a year later, defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground of absence of diversity of citizenship. The
United States District Court sustained the motion and dismissed the action
on June 30, 1959. Plaintiff filed a petition in the instant case in the common
pleas court of Montgomery County on October 13, 1959, and personal
service was made on defendant on October 16, 1959. The common pleas
court sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment, and held that
the cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations since
no action had been commenced in the United States District Court within
the meaning of the saving statute.3
The court held that an action is not "commenced or attempted to be
commenced" unless the petition is filed in the office of the clerk of the proper
court 4 and a summons is issued thereon according to Ohio Revised Code
section 2305.17.5 The court relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. In Kossuth v. Bear,6 plaintiff's cause of action arose from an
automobile accident. Plaintiff first filed a petition in Cuyahoga County
where the defendant resided, but service of summons was not made. Plain-
tiff then filed a petition in Lorain County where the accident occurred,
but no service was made in that county. After the statute of limitations
had run, the Lorain County action was dismissed by the court without
prejudice. Within -one year an amended petition was filed in Cuyahoga
County, and service was made under Ohio Revised Code section 2703.20.
The Ohio Supreme Court held the saving statute not applicable because no
case ever came into existence in Lorain County which could be dismissed.
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10 (1953): "An action for bodily injury or injuring per-
sonal property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.'
3 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.19 (1953):
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judg-
ment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the
merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action at the date of
reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff, or, if he dies and the cause of ac-
tion survives, his representatives may commence a new action within one year
after such date ...
4 Ohio Rev. Code § 2703.01 (1953): "A civil action must be commenced by filing
in the office of the clerk of the proper court a petition and causing a summons to be
issued thereon."
5 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.17 (1953):
An action is commenced within the meaning of sections 2305.03 to 2305.22 in-
clusive, and section 1307.08 of the Revised Code, as to each defendant, at the
date of the summons which is served on him or on a co-defendant who is a joint
contractor, or otherwise united in interest with him. When service by publica-
tibn is proper, the action is commenced at the date of the first publication, if it
is regularly made.
Within the meaning of such sections, an attempt to commence an action is
equivalent to its commencement, when the party diligently endeavors to procure
a service, if such attempt is followed by service within sixty days.
6 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954).
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Clearly there was no commencement of an action under Ohio Revised Code
section 2305.17 since there was no service of summons, but the supreme
court went on to say that there was no action "attempted to be com-
menced." The court applied the statutory definition of "attempt to com-
mence" as contained in Ohio Revised Code section 2305.17-namely, an
endeavor to procure service followed by service within sixty days-to the
phrase "attempted to be commenced" as contained in the saving statute,
Ohio Revised Code section 2305.19.7 In Hoehn v. Empire Steel Company,8
an action for personal injuries commenced in Cuyahoga County, defendant
corporation was not properly served and therefore the court acquired
no jurisdiction over its person.9 Within one year after the case was dis-
missed for want of service, but after the statute of limitations had run,
plaintiff brought another action in Richland County, and proper service
was made. In a per curiam opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
civil action must be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the
proper court and causing a summons to be issued and served. 10 Since the
court in which the first action was brought had no jurisdiction over the
person of defendant, the supreme court held it could not be the proper
court, and therefore, an action had not been commenced.
In the instant case plaintiff relied upon Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago,
and St. Louis Railway Company v. Bemis," which was the leading cae
on the saving statute decided prior to Kossutk and Hoehn. In the Bemis
case plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, sued defendants, an Ohio corporation
and a New York corporation, in federal court. Since diversity of citizenship
was lacking, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter. Plaintiff then brought an action in the Superior Court of Cincin-
nati after the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action but within
one year of the dismissal by the federal court. The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the proceeding in the federal court was a commencement, and
that plaintiff failed otherwise than upon the merits in federal court. The
7 See Eastman and Kane, "Commencement of a Civil Action in Ohio for Applica-
tion of the Statute of Limitations," 16 Ohio St. LJ. 140, 152 (1955):
... [1lf there has been an "attempt" followed by service within sixty days, the
action is "commenced" under Section 2305.17, and there is no need in Section
2305.19 for any reference to an action "attempted to be commenced." It might
be assumed that the phrase was included in Section 2309.19 to cover some situa-
tion other than an action commenced under Section 2305.17. At first glance at
least, it would seem that Kossutt v. Bear strikes out of the saving clause for
failure otherwise than on the merits the provision for actions "attempted to be
commenced." It may be that the supreme court sees some difference between
the case in which the defendant has been served with defective summons and
the case in which the defendant is not found at all, and would hold that the
first instance constituted an attempt to commence.
8 172 Ohio St. 285, 175 N.E.2d 172 (1961).
( Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.36 (1953).
10 Ohio Rev. Code § 2703.01 (1953).
11 64 Ohio St. 26, 59 N.E. 745 (1901).
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court rejected the narrow definition of "attempt to commence" which
was later presented in Kossuth and stated that the jurisdiction of the
court does not determine what is, and what is not, an action. The court said:
It is not reasonable we think, to conclude that the legislature in-
tended, by the section in question, to favor suitors who had failed
in a former suit because of the lack of jurisdiction of the parties,
or because a jurisdictional fact, though existent, had not been
stated, and deny like favor to suitors who had happened to fail
because the court in which their attempt had been made was
without jurisdiction of the action on the facts as they actually
existed. If such distinction was intended, we utterly fail to see any
principle on which it could find support. On the other hand, it
seems quite apparent that the intention was to secure that class
of suitors from loss, who, without laches or fault, but from causes
incident to the administration of the law, are compelled to abandon
a present action without a determination of its merits, and give
to such, without distinction, an opportunity, in reasonable time
within the statute, to renew such action.' 2
The only case to reach the United States Supreme Court 13 on the issue
of whether a dismissal of a suit for want of jurisdiction of the subject
matter concludes the right of action, involved a construction of the Ten-
nessee saving statute.14 The circuit court had dismissed the case because
the jurisdictional fact, although existing, had not been pleaded. A second
suit was begun after the statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court
held that the second suit was within the saving statute since the first suit
was dismissed for a defect in pleading, and because plaintiffs were not
guilty of such negligence or carelessness in the bringing of the first suit
as should exclude them from the benefit of the statute. The Court stated
that there might be cases where the lack of jurisdiction in the court was
so clear that the bringing of a suit would amount to such negligence that
the plaintiff should not have the benefit of the saving statute. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court later held in Sweet v. Chattanooga Electric Light
Company15 that an action cannot be commenced in a court which does not
have jurisdiction because the whole proceeding is void, and the effect is the
same as though no suit had been brought. Dissatisfaction with the decision
12 Id. at 38, 59 N.E. at 748.
13 Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426 (1883).
14 Section 2755 of the Tennessee Code of 1858 is substantially the same as the
current section, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-106 (1955):
If the action is commenced within the time limited by a rule or statute of
limitation, but the judgment or decree is rendered against the plaintiff upon
any ground not concluding his right of action, or where the judgment or decree
is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and is arrested, or reversed on appeal, the
plaintiff, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may, from time to
time, commence a new action within one year after the reversal or arrest.
15 97 Tenn. 252, 36 S.W. 1090 (1896).
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in Sweet was indicated by the decisions which followed.16 Finally, the
Tennessee Supreme Court expressly overruled Sweet and held that the
saving statute applied even if the action were commenced originally in a
court that had no jurisdiction, unless the plaintiff was grossly negligent in
choosing the forum of his first suit.17
As a general rule, other jurisdictions with a similar saving statute
agree with Bemis and hold that the dismissal of a former suit for want
of jurisdiction of the subject matter does not constitute a bar to another
action unless laches or bad faith exists even though the general statute of
limitations bars plaintiff's action. Since questions of jurisdiction may be
difficult to determine, there should not be a distinction between the con-
sequences of error made by the plaintiff in good faith with respect to the
jurisdiction of the court and the results of a non-jurisdictional error which
leads to a dismissal which is not on the merits.'8 Although the court will
be called upon to make a fact determination as to the good faith of the
plaintiff in choosing the forum if the Bemis approach is taken, it would
seem that the results reached under this procedure would be more equitable
than the results to which the rule of the instant case may lead.'9
In both Kossuth and Hoehn, service was not obtained within the
period of the statute of limitations, or within the additional sxty-day period
established by Ohio Revised Code section 2305.19. The court was under-
standably unwilling to permit the saving statute to be used to extend by
many months the time within which service must be made upon the de-
fendant. No question of jurisdiction of the subject matter was involved in
either case. Therefore, the reference to the "proper court" in Hoehn
should be understood as referring only to a court which had obtained
16 See, e.g., LaFollette Coal, Iron and Ry. Co. v. Minton, 117 Tenn. 415, 101 S.W.
178 (1907), which indicated that Sweet should be confined to its particular facts. In
Swift and Company v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W.
480 (1913), the court enjoined defendant from relying on a plea of the statute of limita-
tions if a suit was thereafter seasonably brought in a proper law court on the same
cause of action. In Davis v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S.V. 444 (1924), the court held
that if plaintiff was grossly negligent in choosing the forum of the first suit, then Sweet
was correctly decided, but a dismissal for want of jurisdiction under any circumstances
is too broad.
17 Burns v. People's Telephone and Telegraph Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S.W.2d 76
(1930).
18 Gaines v. City of Ne*r York, 215 N.Y. 533, 540, 109 N.E. $94, 596 (1915), in an
opinion by Cardozo, J.: "A suitor who invokes in good faith the aid of the court of
justice and who initiates a proceeding by the service of process must be held to have
commenced an action within the meaning of this statute, though he has mistaken his
forum .... It may be that a different rule should be applied where the earlier action
has been brought with knowledge of the lack of jurisdiction and in fraud of the statute."
19 In the instant case the registered mail return receipt indicated that delivery was
made to defendant in West Carrollton, Ohio, thus putting plaintiff on notice of the pos-
sibility that no diversity of citizenship existed.
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jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by valid service of summons. 20
Kossuth and Hoehn should not have been interpreted as overruling Bemis,
and as requiring that the court have jurisdiction of the subject matter.
It is submitted that the court in the instant case failed to consider the
precise problem before the court in Kossuth and Hoehn, namely, lack
of jurisdiction of the person, and accordingly misinterpreted the language
of the court in those cases.
20 It can be argued that proper as used in Ohio Revised Code section 2703.01 is
only directory and that this section should be interpreted to mean: "A civil action must
be commenced by filing in the office of the clerk of the court, which has been selected by
plaintiff to adjudicate his claim, a petition and causing a summons to be issued thereon."
